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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW – WARRANTLESS SEARCHES –
WHETHER THE SEARCH INCIDENT TO ARREST
EXCEPTION SHOULD APPLY TO DATA STORED ON
CELLULAR PHONES
Jeremy Ray*
United States v. Wurie, 728 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2013)1
I.

FACTS

In 2008, Defendant Brima Wurie was charged with distributing
crack cocaine within 1,000 feet of a school, possession with intent to
distribute, and felony possession of a firearm and ammunition.2
During booking, police inventoried Wurie’s personal property,
including two cellular phones.3 Officers of the Drug Control Unit
examined one of the seized cell phones shortly after Wurie was
brought to the police station.4 The officers used information contained
on Wurie’s cell phone to determine his place of residence, eventually
using this information to obtain and execute a search warrant.5 The
police seized crack cocaine and illegal weapons during this search.6
Wurie contends that the police obtained this evidence illegally, and
therefore the court should suppress it.7
The lower court denied the Defendant’s motion to suppress,
failing to distinguish the “warrantless search of a cell phone from the
search of other types of personal containers found on a defendant’s
person that fall within . . . the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness
requirements.”8 The Defendant was found guilty of felony possession
of a firearm and ammunition, possession of crack cocaine with intent
to distribute, and distribution of crack cocaine.9 Wurrie appealed the
suppression issue to the First Circuit Court of Appeals.10 The proper
standard of review for a denial of a motion to suppress is clear error

*
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United States v. Wurie (Wurie I), 728 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2013).
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for the factual findings and de novo for the conclusions of law.11 The
appellate court reversed the denial of Defendant’s motion to suppress,
vacated his conviction, and remanded his case to the district court.12
II.

ISSUES

The Bill of Rights enumerates certain freedoms that are
fundamental to justice, which set limits on government actions
regarding personal liberties.13 The Fourth Amendment provides
protection from unwarranted searches and seizures, specifically
providing:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
[w]arrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by [o]ath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.14
Here, the Police obtained the seized evidence unlawfully and
unreasonably, contrary to the Constitution of the United States, and
violated Wurie’s expectation of privacy.
The Supreme Court has held that warrantless searches are
presumptively unreasonable absent “one of the narrow and welldelineated exceptions to the warrant requirement . . . .”15 For example,
a search incident to arrest is an exception to the Fourth Amendment’s
requirement that officers obtain a warrant before performing a
search.16 Although it is not unreasonable for police to search any
container or article in a defendant’s possession during standard
booking procedures,17 arguably that search should not extend to a
defendant’s cell phone.

11

United States v. Richardson, 385 F.3d 625, 629 (6th Cir. 2004).
Wurie I, 728 F.3d at 14.
13
See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. IV; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
14
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
15
Flippo v. West Virginia, 528 U.S. 11, 13 (1999) (citing Katz v. United States, 389
U.S. 347, 357 (1967)).
16
United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 234 (1973) (recognizing the need to
protect officers and preserve evidence for later use at trial).
17
Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 648 (1983).
12
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The single-purpose container exception is another narrow
exception to the warrant requirement.18 This exception states that an
individual cannot have a reasonable expectation of privacy for a
container in which the contents are evident by its external
appearance.19 Because its content is not clear by its external
appearance, a cell phone fails to satisfy this definition. Thus, the
owner may have a reasonable expectation of privacy regarding the
phone’s content. Therefore, the district court should have suppressed
the evidence because the search and seizure did not satisfy one of the
narrow exceptions to the warrant requirement.
III.

ANALYSIS & RAMIFICATIONS

A normal incident of custodial arrest justified the possession of
Wurie’s cell phone.20 However, the warrantless search of the content
of Wurie’s cell phone violated his Fourth Amendment rights, and the
court should not have admitted the seized evidence. Thus, the First
Circuit Court of Appeals appropriately held that the district court erred
in ruling that an inspection of a cell phone’s content satisfied the
requirements of a search incident to arrest because Wurie had a
reasonable expectation of privacy for his phone’s content.21
Regarding this issue, some argue that “the Supreme Court and
legislatures should . . . scale back the ability of law enforcement to
search digital devices incident to arrest.”22 In fact, some “lower courts
have incorrectly applied the search incident to arrest exception and
prior Supreme Court precedent . . . .” to authorize cell phone
searches.23 Indeed, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit refused
to recognize a distinction between searching physical containers and
searching electronic equipment for digital information.24
From a defendant’s point of view, one obvious way to prevent
access to potentially incriminating information contained on a cell

18

See California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 580 (1991) (holding the single-purpose
container exception allows officers to bypass the warrant requirement when the
distinctive nature of the container makes the container’s contents a foregone
conclusion); Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 764 n.13 (1979).
19
Sanders, 442 U.S. at 764 n.13.
20
See United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800, 805 (1974).
21
United States v. Wurie (Wurie I), 728 F.3d 1, 14 (1st Cir. 2013).
22
Adam M. Gershowitz, Password Protected? Can a Password Save Your Cell
Phone from a Search Incident to Arrest?, 96 IOWA L. REV. 1125, 1175 (2011).
23
Chelsea Oxton, The Search Incident to Arrest Exception Plays Catch Up: Why
Police May No Longer Search Cell Phones Incident to Arrest Without a Warrant, 43
CREIGHTON L. REV. 1157, 1158 (2010).
24
United States v. Finley, 477 F.3d 250, 260 (5th Cir. 2007).
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phone is password protection; however, password protection alone
may not entirely prevent police access.25 Because law enforcement
officials are increasingly tech-savvy, officers may have the time and
ability to bypass password protection.26
Additionally, courts may face a number of other issues related
to cell phone usage, admissible searches, and law enforcement
intrusion in the future. For example, the court may need to address
whether one who uses a built-in remote access application to wipe a
phone’s content clean is tampering with evidence.
Further,
applications now exist that erase a phone’s content when a person
enters a specific password, or if a person enters a certain number of
incorrect passwords. If prompted to give the phone’s password, the
detainee could give the predetermined password to officers,
eliminating the content upon entry of the password. Would this
qualify as tampering with evidence?
Appropriately, there is no policy that allows officers to search
the cell phones of arrestees for their own amusement. However, this is
precisely what happened to Nathan Newhard when he was arrested for
driving while intoxicated.27 The police conducted a search incident to
arrest and found a cell phone.28 One officer viewed the phone’s
content, discovering pictures of Newhard and his former girlfriend in
“sexually compromising positions.”29 Worse still, the officer shared
these pictures with others at the police station, causing Newhard both
personal and professional harm.30 While this example is extreme, the
situation illustrates what can happen when society devalues an
individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The use of cell phones in today’s society is pervasive. The
time when cell phones were simply a small, portable way of making a
call has long passed. For example, cell phones now function as
calculators, cameras, flashlights, GPSs, and watches. Additionally,
and more significantly, smart phones allow the exchange of
documents, pictures, videos, text messages, and emails at the touch of

25

Gershowitz, supra note 22, at 1175 (recognizing that “computer-savvy officers” at
the police station may have the time and technology to unlock a phone’s contents).
26
Id.
27
Newhard v. Borders, 649 F. Supp. 2d 440, 444 (W.D. Va. 2009).
28
Id.
29
Id.
30
Id.

2014]

WARRANTLESS SEARCHES…CELLULAR PHONES

215

a button.31 In fact, nearly fifty-six percent of American adults now
own a smart phone of some kind.32 Based on these facts, it seems
obvious that a person would have a reasonable expectation of privacy
in his or her phone’s content. A court should not determine that the
search of this content is permissible incident to a valid arrest merely
because an individual is in custody. Instead, courts should require a
warrant from a neutral magistrate before officers may rummage
through an individual’s cellular device.
Ultimately, the Supreme Court must decide the validity of
warrantless searches of cell phones incident to arrest. Consequently,
the First Circuit denied rehearing en banc to hurry this issue to the
Supreme Court.33 Similarly, though factually distinct, a case has been
brought before the Court asking “[w]hether or under what
circumstances the Fourth Amendment permits police officers to
conduct a warrantless search of the digital contents of an individual’s
cell phone seized from the person at the time of arrest.”34 The
Supreme Court, in making this decision, will have to balance
individuals’ reasonable privacy interests with the potential usefulness
of such information by law enforcement. I believe the Supreme Court
will eventually decide that the warrantless search of a cell phone
incident to arrest is indeed intrusive, requiring the approval of a neutral
magistrate.
The Supreme Court, subsequent to the completion of this article but
before publication, issued an opinion concerning this case. Chief
Justice Roberts delivered the opinion of the Court stating:
Modern cell phones are not just another technological
convenience. With all they contain and all they may
reveal, they hold for many Americans “the privacies of
life[.]” The fact that technology now allows an
individual to carry such information in his hand does
not make the information any less worthy of the
protection for which the Founders fought. Our answer
to the question of what police must do before searching

31

Adam M. Gershowitz, The iPhone Meets the Fourth Amendment, 56 UCLA L.
REV. 27, 41-42 (2008).
32
AARON SMITH, SMARTPHONE OWNERSHIP—2013 UPDATE 2 (2013), available at
http://www.pewinternet.org/files/oldmedia//Files/Reports/2013/PIP_Smartphone_adoption_2013_PDF.pdf.
33
United States v. Wurie (Wurie III), 724 F.3d 255, 255 (1st Cir. 2013).
34
Brief for Petitioner at i, Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014) (No. 13-132),
2013 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 3082.
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a cell phone seized incident to an arrest is accordingly
simple — get a warrant.35
This quote from the Chief Justice echoes the premise of the
article. We should not forfeit individual liberties when such a
simple solution exists – “get a warrant.”36

35
36

Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2494-95 (2014) (citation omitted).
Id.

